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COMMENTS
PARENT AND CHILD-IMMUNITY FROM ACTIONS
BASED ON PERSONAL TORTS
There has arisen, in the United States, a conflicting body of decisions
regarding suits for personal torts between parents and children. In 1891
the Mississippi Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hewellette v.
George' announcing that, "The peace of society, and of the families com-
posing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose
of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a
right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.' 2
This case has been regarded as the foundation for the rule that a parent
is immune from suit by an unemancipated minor child for personal torts.3
The Hewellette case cited no authority for its decision, but many courts
regard this decision as a statement of the common law.4 The more recent
decisions, however, recognize that there was no rule of immunity at com-
mon law.5 Whether or not there was an immunity rule at common law,
is a moot question since there are no English cases, ancient or modern,
which discuss the point."
BASIS OF THE IMMUNITY
Since the appearance, and general adoption of the immunity rule, sev-
eral reasons have been advanced as the basis of the rule. The most com-
mon and often cited reason given by the courts when applying the rule
is that public policy recognizes the maintenance of family tranquility and
1 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
2 Ibid., at 706, 887.
3 Although the Hewellette case was the first to pronounce the immunity rule, there
are prior cases which hint at such a rule. See, in this regard, Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859) which contains dicta to the effect that, from the intimacy
and nature of the family relation, and the necessary character of family government,
the law suffers no intrusion upon the authority of the parent and the privacy of domes-
tic life, except in extreme cases of cruelty and injustice. Gould v. Christianson, Blatchf.
& H. 507, 10 Fed. Cas. 857 (1836) states that a father enjoys immunity to chastise a child
at his discretion without responsibility to the law.
4 Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E. 2d 676 (1952); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich.
175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
5 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930).
0 There is one Scottish case, Young v. Rankin, [1934] Sc. 499, which held that an
action of tort is competent at the instance of a minor son against his father.
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requires that suits between parents and children not be permitted. 7 Those
courts which have allowed a suit against the parent have countered the
above reasoning by holding that in the comparatively rare case where a
child brings a tort action, the likelihood is that either the peace of the
home has already been disturbed beyond repair,8 or that, because of the
existing circumstances, the suit will not disturb existing tranquility.
Another theory advocated in support of the immunity rule is that
actions by children against their parents tend to undermine parental au-
thority and discipline. 10 It has been held, however, that where the suit has
nothing to do with parental authority and control, it cannot be said that
the suit weakens those sinews of family life."
The "family exchequer" argument was propounded as a reason for the
immunity rule in Roller v. Roller,12 where the court held that the public
has an interest in the financial welfare of all minor members of the family
and, therefore, the family property should not be appropriated by any
one child. This argument fails to take into account the parent's power to
distribute his favors as he will or that the child has no legally recognized
claim to any portion of the parent's property, or even to equality of
treatment.13 Related to the "family exchequer" argument is the theory
that in absence of the immunity rule, the father might inherit any money
the child would recover in an action against the parent.14
The possibility of collusion and danger of fraud has been mentioned
as a reason for applying the rule, especially in those cases involving liabil-
ity insurance. 15 It has been said, however, that the fact that there may be
greater opportunity for fraud or collusion in one class of cases than an-
other, does not warrant courts of law in closing the door to all cases of
that class. The fraud and collusion argument was also used in connection
7 Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis.
260, 212 N.V. 787 (1927); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Adt. 198 (1925); Small
v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885 (1891).
8 Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A. 2d 923 (1951).
9 Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P. 2d 149 (1952); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H.
352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930).
10 Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Ad. 753 (1929); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis.
260, 212 N.W.787 (1927); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
11 Authority cited note 9, supra.
12 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
13 Authority cited note 9, supra.
14 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
'5 Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677 (App. D. C., 1948); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 254,
135 A. 2d 65 (1957); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E. 2d 438 (1938).
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with the automobile guest statute cascs, but courts have consistently al-
lowed recovery by a guest. In theory, there is no difference between that
situation and a suit against a parent.16
The common-law rule that a wife could not sue her husband for a
personal tort has been held analogous to the parent-child relationship as
justification for the immunity rule."7 The courts which follow this reason-
ing fail to take into account the rationale of the husband-wife immunity;
that is, at common law the husband and wife were regarded as one person,
and there is no comparable relationship in the case of parent and child.'
Other reasons advanced for applying the immunity rule are that if
there was no rule, the child would be permitted to bring a "stale" action
after reaching majority; 19 and the concept of a sovereign family govern-
ment depends upon the immunity rule.20
EXTENT OF THE IMMUNITY RULE
Until 1930, the immunity rule was applied with steadfast regularity in
most jurisdictions, without regard to the nature of the tort. This absolute
application of the rule resulted in some anomalous and loudly criticized
decisions. 21
In the famous case of Dunlap v. Dunlap,2- the plaintiff, an unemanci-
pated minor, was injured while working on a construction job for his
father, a contractor and builder. In allowing a recovery, the court said:
There never has been a common-law rule that a child could not sue its parent.
It is a misapprehension of the situation to start with that idea and to treat the
suits which have been allowed as exceptions to a general rule. The minor has the
same right to redress for wrongs as any other individual.... Out of it all there
emerges one substantial and reasonable ground for denying a recovery, and one
only. The parental authority should be so far supreme that whatever would
unduly impair it should be foregone by the child for his ultimate good.23
This decision was the first major break with the idea of an absolute im-
munity. The Dunlap case held that there is immunity only where the
suit or prospect of suit might disturb family relations.
16 Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P. 2d 149 (1952).
17 Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl. 753 (1929).
18 Authority cited note 9, supra.
19 Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
20 Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929); Matarese v. Matarese, 47
R.I. 131, 131 Att. 198 (1925).
21 In Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 789 (1905), the defendant was previously
convicted of raping his minor daughter. She sued for damages and the court dismissed
the suit, applying the immunity rule, and holding that the maintenance of harmonious
and proper family relations called for application of the rule.
22 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atd. 905 (1930). 23 Ibid., at 354, 906.
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Relying on the Dunlap case, other jurisdictions have adopted the view
that where the injury is outside the scope of parental duties, there is no
immunity, and the child may recover. In Signs v. Signs, 24 the court stated:
In these modern times, with the advent of the motor vehicle and the growing
complications of business and industry and where in an industrial age we are
living under changed conditions, it would seem a fantastic anomaly that in a
case where two minor children were negligently injured in the operation of a
business, one of them, a stranger, could recover compensation for his injuries
and the other one, a minor child of the owner of the business, could not.... In
view of the changed conditions to which we have referred, we have come to the
conclusion that, if there ever was any justification for the rule announced in
Mississippi in 1891, that justification has now disappeared and that an unemanci-
pated child should have as clear a right to maintain an action in tort against his
parent in the latter's business or vocational capacity as such child would have to
maintain an action in relation to his property rights.2 5
In the area of wilful torts, as distinguished from simple negligence,
almost all courts today refuse to apply the immunity rule.26 The courts
reason that leaving a child without redress for a wrong suffered through
wilful or malicious misconduct is more repugnant than allowing a child
to sue its parent.2 7 Of course, some allegation of facts to show in what
way the parent allegedly wilfully injured the child must be made, and
without such factual allegations, the nature of the action is not so changed
as to take it out of the immunity rule.2 8 In a recent opinion, the Illinois
Supreme Court said:
Any justification for the rule of parental immunity can be found only in a
reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the family unit.
While this policy may be such justification to prevent suits for mere negligence
within the scope of the parental relationship we do not conceive that public
policy should prevent a minor from obtaining redress for wilful and wanton
misconduct on the part of a parent. To tolerate such misconduct and deprive
a child of relief will not foster family unity but will deprive a person of redress,
without any corresponding social benefit, for an injury long recognized at com-
mon law.
2 9
24 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743 (1952).
25 Ibid., at 575, 748. Accord: Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P. 2d 149 (1952);
Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E. 2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166
S.E. 538 (1932).
2 6 Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 IHl. 2d 608, 131 N.E. 2d 525 (1956); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.
2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218 (1955); Siembab v. Siembab, 284 App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 437
(1954); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950).
27 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218 (1955); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Marchand, [1924) 4 D.L.R. 157 (Canada, 1923).
2 8 Siembab v. Siembab, 284 App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 437 (1954).
29 Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 111. 2d 608, 619, 131 N.E. 2d 525, 531 (1956).
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In cases where the child sues the parent in another capacity, or indirect-
ly, there is some divergence of opinion. It has been held that an unemanci-
pated child may maintain an action in tort against a corporation of which
his parents own one half of the outstanding stock30 Where the plaintiff
was injured as a result of his father's negligent operation of an automobile
owned by a third party, the court dismissed the suit against the third
party because the defendant could recover from plaintiff's father and
fasten ultimate liability on the father in contravention of the immunity
rule.3' Similarly, a child was not allowed to sue his father's partner where
the injury occured within the scope of the partnership business.32
There have been, in recent years, many suits where the injuries arose
out of the negligent operation of an automobile. In these automobile cases,
the courts are in apparent agreement that where the child, while riding
in the family automobile, is injured as a result of negligence on the part
of the parent driver, no cause of action against the parent may be main-
tained.33 Courts have expressed the view that these automobile injuries
are within the scope of parental authority.3 4
EFFECT OF DEATH OF PARENT OR CHILD
Some courts have held that where either the parent or child is dead,
there is no domestic harmony to be protected, and the immunity rule
should not apply. In Davis v. Smith,35 the court stated:
It [the immunity rule] should not shield the parent where the matter arises
from a "non-parental" occurrence, or where the parent commits an atrocious
assault outraging the duties imposed upon him as a parent by society, or where
either the parent or child is dead and there is thus no tranquil relationship
between them to preserve.3 6
Other courts are of the opinion that death of either party does not affect
the immunity rule. In Lasecki v. Kabara,3 7 it was said:
It is, to say the least, shocking to our concept of justice that an unemanci-
pated child, who has no cause of action against his living parent, may, if the
parent die, and contingent upon such event, have a cause of action against his
parent's estate or his administrator.88
Where either the parent or child is dead, the very basis of the immunity
rule is undermined, there is no domestic harmony to be preserved, there
3OFoy v. Foy Electric Co., 231 N.C. 161, 56 S.E. 2d 418 (1949).
31 Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W. 2d 37 (1952).
32 Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W. 1 (1932).
33 Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P. 2d 149 (1952). Contra: Wells v. Wells, (Mo.
App.) 48 S.W. 2d 109 (1932). Note discussion of liability insurance, infra.
84 Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W. 2d 29 (1953).
a5 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa., 1954).
.6 Ibid., at 504. Accord: Brower v. Webb, 5 D. & C. 2d 193 (Pa. Coin. P., 1955).
17 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940). 38 Ibid., at 649, 35.
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is no question of parental control, and it seems illogical to apply the rule
in these cases. Logically, the maxim mutata legis ratione, mutatar et lex' 9
should apply and recovery should be allowed.
EFFECT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
The question of whether the fact that the parent has liability insurance
precludes application of the immunity rule, is perhaps the most contro-
versial issue in the field of parent-child tort actions. The argument for
abandoning the immunity rule in cases where there is liability insurance
is based upon the theory that since the parent does not have to pay the
judgment, there is no disruption of family harmony, hence the rule does
not apply.4"
Those courts which hold that liability insurance does not affect thc
immunity rule, base their decisions upon the theory that collusive action
and fraud would result; and the presence of insurance should not give a
cause of action where none existed before.41 Recovery is also denied in
those states which allow an action directly against an insurer, the courts
holding that since the plaintiff could not recover from the insured, he
cannot recover from the insurer.4 2
In Elias v. Collins,43 one of the first cases in which the effect of insur-
ance upon the rule was an issue, the court, in denying recovery, said:
Plaintiff's counsel recognizes this as a rule of the common law, but he argues
that modern business methods have so changed, with the coming of the auto-
mobile and the insurance thereon, that the common-law rule should be modified
to allow minors to recover against their father for torts, inasmuch as insurance
companies promise to reimburse the insured for any judgment gotten against
him for injuries caused by the automobile. Perhaps there is a spice of good sense
in this, but, if the rule is to fade away because the reason is gone for its existence,
what will we say as to boys who are injured while working on farms or in indus-
trial plants, by reason of the negligence of their fathers? In these cases there is
as much need of the common-law rule as there ever was.44
The plaintiff has been denied recovery even where automobile liability
insurance is compulsory. In Parks v. Parks,45 it was argued that since the
state Motor Vehicle Act made liability insurance compulsory, and the
39 When the reason of a law is changed, the law also is changed.
40 Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E. 2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17,
166 S.E. 538 (1932); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930).
41 Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677 (App. D.C., 1948); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 254,
135 A. 2d 65 (1957); Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A. 2d 563 (1954); Duffy
v. Duffy, 117 Pa. Super. 500, 178 At. 165 (1935); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211
N.W. 88 (1926).
42 Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E. 2d 343 (1939).
43237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926).
44 Ibid., at 178, 89. 45 390 Pa. 254, 135 A. 2d 65 (1957).
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damages sought did not exceed the amount of the policy, recovery should
be allowed. The court denied recovery, holding that insurance does not
create a cause of action in and of itself.
It was held in Lusk v. Lusk, 46 that where the parent is protected by
insurance, there is no reason for applying the immunity rule. The court
cited Dunlap v. Dunlap47 with approval, and said:
There is no reason for applying the rule in the instant case. This action is not
unfriendly as between the daughter and her father. A recovery by her is no loss
to him. In fact, their interests unite in favor of her recovery. . . .There is no filial
recrimination and no pitting of the daughter against the father in this case. No
strained family relations will follow. On the contrary, the daughter must honor
the father for attempting to provide compensation against her misfortune.
Family harmony is assured instead of disrupted. A wrong is righted instead of
"privileged."1 8
Although the arguments of the courts which have accepted the view
that insurance precludes application of the immunity rule are sound, most
courts are adamant in denying recovery, holding that it is a matter for
the legislature.
CONCLUSION
Since the adoption of the immunity rule, only one clearcut exception
to the rule has developed-in the case of a wilful tort.49 In recent years,
however, there has been a trend toward abrogating the rule in cases
where the tort is committed in the business or vocational capacity of the
parent, 10 where one of the parties is dead,5 ' or where there is liability
insurance involved -.52 Whether this trend will grow and finally over-
shadow the rule remains to be seen. It seems reasonable to assume that.
in the future, the more progressive courts will allow suits between parents
and children in all cases where the family tranquility will not be disturbed.
• 6 113 AV. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). 4784 N.H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930).
4 8 Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 19, 166 S.E. 538, 539 (1932).
49 Authority cited note 26, supra. 51 Authority cited notes 35, 36, supra.
50 Authority cited note 25, supra. 52 Authority cited note 40, supra.
SOCIETIES REQUIRING NO BELIEF IN GOD ALLOWED
TO SHARE IN RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTIONS
When a court undertakes to define religion, its decision raises questions
of importance in the area of freedom of religion and separation of Church
and State. For the most part, the courts in the past have stated that "re-
ligion" suggests the concept of a Supreme Being, a Governor of the
Universe. However, this generally accepted concept in American juris-
prudence has just come under severe attack.
